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Abstract: The Lisbon Treaty has put the consistency of European Union (EU) external action 
high on the agenda but little is known about how this imperative is concretely given shape. 
Adopting a single-case-study approach on the EU’s decision in 2012 to renew the partial 
suspension of development cooperation with Zimbabwe (Article 96 measures), this 
contribution aims to provide better insights into the question of the consistency of this 
decision. More specifically, this article focuses on the Commission’s proposal, on the basis of 
which the renewal of the suspension was adopted. As a first step it examines the relevant legal 
(Treaty), substantial (policy framework) and procedural (decision-making) guidelines framing 
the consistency objective in the EU’s relations with Zimbabwe. While this three-level 
framework plays an important role in facilitating the consistency of the Commission proposal, 
it is also clear that it does not provide a sufficient guarantee for a consistent policy output. 
The case study on Zimbabwe shows how other factors such as the international context, the 
positions of the member states as well as the preferences and interests of individual 
Directorate Generals play an important role in the final outcome of the Commission’s 
decision-making process. 
Keywords: CFSP; development policy; European Commission; Lisbon Treaty; policy 
coordination; trade policy; political science.  
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Introduction 
In a new attempt to further increase the EU’s international actorness, the Lisbon Treaty1 has 
put the issue of the consistency of European external action high on the agenda. The 
abolishment of the pillar structure, the introduction of common objectives for the different 
external policies, and the creation of the new position of the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President (HRVP) are some of the most visible measures 
that have been taken. Article 21.3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 2  explicitly 
mandates the HRVP to assist the Council and the Commission to ensure the consistency of 
external action. This central role is not surprising. As chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and 
Vice President of the European Commission, the double-hatted HRVP, assisted by her own 
external action service, the European External Action Service (EEAS), is particularly well-
placed to fulfill this mandate.  
The merger of the three positions of the Commissioner of External Relations, the rotating 
Presidency and the High Representative (HR) (first established under the Treaty of 
Amsterdam
3)
 was supposed to put an end to the inter-institutional wrangling and contradictory 
policy directions of the different players. In reality however, it quickly became clear that the 
                                                             
1
 Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development (RTD), launched in 1984, are 
the Union’s main instrument for funding research in Europe.  
2 Council of the EU (2012), Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
6655/7/08 REV 7, 12. November 2012, Brussels, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ 
doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%206655%202008%20REV%207, accessed 01.12.2014.  
3
 European Union (1997), Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Luxembourg: Office for official 
publications of the European Communities, http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/ 
pdf/treaty_of_amsterdam/treaty_of_amsterdam_en.pdf, accessed 21.11.2014. 
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setup had created new challenges. In the area of trade and development for example, the point 
of gravity today continues to be with the European Commission, whereas it remains with the 
Council and new players such as the HRVP and the EEAS in the field of foreign and security 
policy. The question therefore arising is whether the scope for consistency in the post-Lisbon 
period has really improved and whether the “cure” devised is not worse than the “disease”. 
This contribution tries to get a better understanding of how, in the post-Lisbon era, the 
objective of consistency of EU external action is given shape. It does so through a single case 
study of the 2012 Commission’s proposal to renew Article 96 measures against Zimbabwe. 
Under this Article, the EU may adopt "appropriate measures" against an Africa, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) partner considered in breach of the so-called “essential elements”. What 
constitutes “essential elements” is defined by Article 9 of the Cotonou agreement4 as being 
the “respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law”. While the decision 
to adopt such measures is, in the first place, a political one, it also has implications for the 
development cooperation and trade relations with the targeted country. The issue of the 
consistency of appropriate measures is central in the Commission’s thinking. Indeed, it 
considers that only a consistent approach may lead to an effective action – defined as the 
restoration of the essential elements in the country targeted. The consistency challenge is all 
the more relevant to study because since the initial decision to adopt appropriate measures 
against Zimbabwe in 2002, the EU’s action has often been criticized for its inconsistency. In 
the absence of earlier work on the case, we have opted for a process-tracing approach, 
examining in detail the drafting of the Commission’s proposal under the leadership of the 
EEAS in association with the Commission.
5
 The paper only focuses on the Commission as it 
is the institution that has the initiative in the Article 96 procedure. The data for the case study 
has been collected through fourteen semi-structured interviews conducted with EU officials 
from the Commission and the EEAS and with national diplomats from Permanent 
Representations in Brussels.
6
 EU officials from Directorate General (DG) Devco, DG Trade 
and the EEAS were selected for interviews on the basis of their involvement in the 
preparation of the Commission’s proposal on Zimbabwe. Interviews were successively 
triangulated with documentary analysis. Although the focus on a single case may not allow us 
to draw general conclusions at this stage, the detailed process-tracing should allow us to come 
to precise insights as to how the EU post-Lisbon deals with proposals touching upon different 
dimensions of EU external action.  
 
                                                             
4
 Agreement amending for the second time the Partnership Agreement between the members of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its 
Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as first amended in Luxembourg 
on 25 June 2005, OJ L 287/3-49, 4.11.2010. 
5
 Although since Lisbon, the EEAS acts as chef de file, the proposal to renew Art. 96 is formally still a 
Commission proposal, adopted by the College of Commissioners (see infra). 
6
 The list of interviews is available in the references section. In the article, interviews are coded as 
Interview 1, 2, etc. in chronological order. The set of interviews conducted on the 2012 proposal was 
complemented by another set of interviews conducted as part of a PhD research on the initial 
Commission’s proposal, adopted in 2002, to suspend development cooperation in Zimbabwe 
(Marangoni 2014). 
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The research question addressed in this article is to what extent the 2012 Commission 
proposal to renew Article 96 measures against Zimbabwe is consistent and how we can 
explain this outcome. The question is being addressed by successively examining how and at 
what levels consistency is aimed, to what extent the policy output is consistent and under 
which circumstances coordination, defined as a key instrument to realize a consistent output, 
is successful.  
This article starts by defining the multi-dimensional concept of consistency. It shows how a 
three-level framework – including the Treaty on European Union, the relevant policy 
framework and Commission internal decision-making – provides for the legal, substantial and 
procedural guidelines to meet the consistency objective. By analysing the Commission’s 
proposal on appropriate measures against Zimbabwe, it then provides a qualitative assessment 
of the consistency of the output. Lastly, it explores the internal and external factors that 
impacted the concrete implementation of the three-level guidelines for meeting the 
consistency objective. 
1. Studying consistency 
Consistency has been a concern in EU external action for four decades already. It was 
mentioned for the first time in the Treaties with the Single European Act
7
, only to be 
reaffirmed and emphasised more strongly by the Maastricht Treaty
8
 and its successors (Duke 
2002: 488; Smith 2001: 171; Nuttall 2000: 21). Many scholars and practitioners reflect on the 
consistency concern (for an overview, see for instance Duke 2011; Portela and Raube 2009). 
Although it goes beyond the scope of this article to repeat these previous debates, it is 
important to present a working definition of the term as well as to briefly introduce the 
different dimensions of the consistency challenge. In line with legal scholars, we define 
consistency as the quality of a policy output free of contradictions (Tietje 1997) and opt for 
the definition of Krenzler and Schneider who characterise it as a “coordinated (…) behaviour 
(…) where comparable and compatible methods are used in pursuit of a single objective and 
result in an uncontradictory (foreign) policy” (Krenzler and Schneider 1997: 134). 
Besides emphasising the fact that the policy output should be contradiction-free, Krenzler and 
Schneider also outline that a mix of policies is needed to achieve a particular objective and 
they point to the centrality of coordination in achieving consistency. Consistency and 
coordination are not the same: coordination is an instrument of decision-making necessary to 
reach consistency and it is only if coordination is successful that the policy output is 
consistent. As a result, coordination will constitute a key dimension of the research (see 
                                                             
7
 European Union (1987), Treaties establishing the European Communities – Treaties amending these 
Treaties: Single European Act, Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European 
Communities, http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/pdf/treaties_establishing_the_europe 
an_communities_single_european_act/treaties_establishing_the_european_communities_single_europ
ean_act_en.pdf, accessed 21.11.2014. 
8
 European Union (1992), Treaty on European Union, Luxembourg: Office for official publications of 
the European Communities, available at http://europa.eu/eu-law/decisionmaking/treaties/pdf/ 
treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf, accessed 21.11.2014. 
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below). In line with the English version of the Treaty on European Union, the paper uses the 
term consistency rather than coherence. As argued by Hillion (2008), coherence goes a step 
further than consistency and its requirement of an absence of contradictions: it implies 
positive synergies between different policy fields. This would require to also study the 
implementation of the Commission proposal and its consequences, a dimensions that falls 
outside the scope of this paper (Marangoni 2014).  
Following from the above definition, a Commission’s proposal is consistent if its content does 
not contradict its primary objective. Assessing consistency is not a binary choice – 
consistency or inconsistency – but a matter of degree. For the purpose of our analysis, we 
distinguish the following degrees along the consistency/inconsistency continuum: 
1. High consistency: a proposal is highly consistent when all its provisions fully support 
and further strengthen the primary objective(s) that this proposal sets; 
2. Medium consistency: a proposal reaches a medium degree of consistency when its 
provisions do neither contradict the primary objective(s) nor significantly add to its 
(their) achievement;  
3. Low consistency: low consistency qualifies a situation in which none of the 
provisions of a proposal contradict the primary objective(s) but a few jeopardise its 
secondary objective(s); 
4. Inconsistency: a proposal is inconsistent when there is a contradiction between its 
primary objective and its provisions. 
This scale will be applied to assess the degree of consistency reached in the 2012 
Commission’s proposal (European Commission 2012b). 
One of the challenges for those studying consistency is its multi-dimensional character. The 
literature has identified four dimensions, including vertical, institutional, horizontal and 
external consistency (Nuttall 2005: 96-107). While vertical inconsistency arises from 
contradictions between the action of the EU and of its member states, institutional 
inconsistency refers to inter- and intra-institutional conflicts at the European level. Horizontal 
consistency refers to the tensions that may arise between different policy areas. In the context 
of this article, it relates to the possible contradictions between objectives in the fields of trade, 
development and foreign policy. Lastly, external consistency refers both to an actor’s capacity 
to present itself as acting consistently and to the way the partners of this actor perceive its 
action. This article mainly focuses on horizontal consistency (across external policies) within 
the Commission (intra-institutional consistency) and between the Commission and the EEAS 
(inter-institutional). The vertical dimension of consistency – between the EU and member 
states – will not be addressed as it concerns the implementation phase, which is outside the 
scope of this research that focuses on the Commission’s internal decision-making up to the 
adoption of the proposal by the College of Commissioners.  
A complex phenomenon, consistency is difficult to study and it is therefore not surprising that 
much of the literature remains at the more general or conceptual level (Hartlapp, Metz and 
Rauh 2012). This article however aims to go beyond this approach and has developed a 
conceptual frame through which it aspires to assess the consistency of the Commission’s 
policy output. Focusing on the Commission and what substantially and procedurally 
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constrains its action, we have identified the different levels at which the consistency 
requirement is expressed. The combination of the following three levels aims to and realises 
consistency throughout the preparation of any Commission decision:  
 EU Treaty framework, 
 particular policy frameworks, and  
 the Commission’s internal decision-making process in external policies.  
These three levels can be seen as the three layers of a pyramid starting from the general and 
legal consistency requirement in the Treaty to its application in policy-specific settings and to 
its operationalization by specific decision-making rules. First, the Treaty framework, and 
more particularly its Article 21.3 TEU, provide for the general and legal framework for the 
consistency of EU external action (Nuttall 2005: 98-100). This general provision is supported 
by the existence of a single title on external action (title V) and a single set of principles and 
objectives (Articles 21.1 and 21.2 TEU), as well as by provisions specifying institutional 
responsibilities for consistency (Articles 13, 16.6, 18.4 and 21.3 TEU).  
The second level of the policy framework specifies the general commitment to consistency 
provided for in the Treaty framework. This level refers to strategies and policy guidelines, 
providing – by definition – a policy-specific framework for consistency. For instance, in the 
case of appropriate measures, the Cotonou agreement, as well as the concept of targeted 
sanctions, frame the Commission’s action. Overall, the policy framework aims at providing a 
comprehensive approach to any objective, outlining policy inter-dependencies and detailing 
the contributions of individual actions thereto.  
The Commission’s internal decision-making process constitutes the third level. It 
operationalises the consistency objective by specifying the consistency mandates of certain 
actors and the rules along which a proposal is drafted. Decision-making strongly emphasises 
the importance of coordination throughout the preparation of any proposal. Coordination is 
the practical instrument through which the EU puts into effect the consistency requirement 
between different policy domains. For instance, when the Commission drafts a proposal, 
inter-service consultation aims at coordination between DGs to produce a collegiate decision. 
Consequently, coordination will be at the centre of our attention when process-tracing the 
Zimbabwe case study. However, although coordination aims at ensuring the consistency of 
the policy output, it is not a sufficient guarantee for consistency. Whether or not coordination 
will be ultimately successful depends on the contextual factors in which the coordination 
process takes place. We will come back to this issue in the final part of this contribution. As a 
first step we will identify the provisions that were in place to facilitate the consistency of the 
Article 96 measures against Zimbabwe. While the Treaty provisions are of a general nature, 
the policy frame and the decision-making rules are case-specific. 
2. The proposal to renew appropriate measures against Zimbabwe in 2012 
The Zimbabwean question has been challenging the EU since President Mugabe’s accession 
to power in 1980. Once a hero of the independence war, he gradually started to engage in 
violent acts against his own population. Massive human rights violations, as well as disrespect 
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for democratic principles and the rule of law, led the EU to condemn the regime. Between 
2002 and 2012, the Union has renewed its sanction package against Zimbabwe on a yearly 
basis, comprising CFSP sanctions and appropriate measures under Article 96 of the Cotonou 
agreement. It was not until 2008 that there were the first signs of a positive political evolution 
with the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the negotiation of the 
Global Political Agreement (GPA). The latter is an agreement signed between the ruling party 
and the opposition charting a new political direction for the country in an effort to address the 
political and economic crisis. It has led the EU to adjust its policy and reengage with 
Zimbabwe. Appropriate measures, the focus of this case study, have proved to be a delicate 
instrument to use, at the crossroads of foreign policy, development and trade objectives. The 
last renewal of these measures in 2012, on the basis of a Commission proposal, is discussed in 
detail below. The following sections explore how the three-level framework for consistency 
concretely played out in the Zimbabwean case. 
2.1. The Treaty framework for consistency 
As mentioned before, consistency is affirmed as a guiding principle of EU external action 
(Article 21.3 TEU). Significantly, in the set of common principles and objectives for EU 
external action, the TEU emphasises the integrated nature of foreign policy, development and 
trade (Article 21 TEU), i.e. all three dimensions of the partnership with Zimbabwe. It is more 
particularly specified that the Union aims to 
(a) safeguard its values (…) 
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights (…) 
(c) preserve peace (…) 
(d) foster the (…) development of developing countries (…) 
(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy (…). (Article 
21.2 TEU) 
As such, the Treaty framework provides substantial guidelines that frame the Commission’s 
action when adopting i.a. appropriate measures under Article 96 of the Cotonou agreement. 
Little is however said as to how these general principles have to be translated into practice. 
This is left to the policy framework and the decision-making process. 
2.2. The policy framework for consistency  
The policy framework is the second level of relevance for understanding the parameters 
within which various actors operate to put into effect the consistency requirement. It specifies 
the – general – Treaty framework for consistency in one particular area and therefore further 
contributes to the framing of EU action. For the case study on Zimbabwe, the policy 
framework consists of the Cotonou agreement, and more particularly its Article 96, as well as 
the concept of targeted sanctions.  
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The Cotonou agreement (2000-2020) encompasses all three dimensions of EU external 
action: development cooperation, foreign policy and trade. Development cooperation is often 
the first element that comes to mind since poverty reduction, sustainable development and 
integration into the world economy are the central objectives of the Cotonou agreement. They 
are pursued through integrated strategies bringing together these different dimensions. The 
European Development Fund (EDF) is the main financial instrument in that respect. Trade is 
understood as a key dimension to promote economic development and the integration of ACP 
into the world economy. Before 2007, the Cotonou agreement provided for non-reciprocal 
trade preferences. Today, EU-Zimbabwe trade falls under the Interim Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) with Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA).
9
 This agreement entered into 
force in May 2012 and introduces a duty-free-quota-free access for all imports from ESA 
(Interviews 2, 12; European Commission 2012a; European Commission, DG Development 
and Cooperation – EuropeAid 2010). Lastly, the foreign policy dimension gained a protected 
legal status with the introduction of conditionality during the mid-term review of Lomé IV in 
1995. Human rights, democracy and the rule of law became “essential elements” (Article 9), 
whose continued respect is the objective of the Article 8 regular political dialogue between 
the EU and any ACP partner, as well as of the safeguard mechanism of Article 96.  
Article 96 of the Cotonou agreement protects the so-called “essential elements” – democratic 
principles, human rights and the rule of law. The EU activates the mechanism to pressure a 
partner’s government into restoring essential elements through a partial or total suspension of 
EU development cooperation and the withdrawal of trade preferences (Portela 2007: 40). 
Benefits are restored only if conditions defined by the EU are fulfilled. For instance, the 
Commission’s proposal COM(2012)26 final recognises that “the overall situation has 
improved” but regrets that “the implementation of political reforms remains slow, and certain 
essential elements of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, to which the GNU has committed 
in the Global Political Agreement, still need to be implemented” (European Commission 
2012b:7 and 3). As a consequence, it proposes to renew Article 96 measures.  
Article 96 is only activated when the regular political dialogue under Article 8 fails to prevent 
the breach or restoration of essential elements. In a first phase, it leads to the opening of 
emergency consultations between parties. These consultations are goal-oriented and aim at 
restoring essential elements. The second step is the resuming of the consultation phase: if a 
checklist and timetable have been agreed on by both the EU and the ACP country for 
restoring essential elements, no further measures are taken; otherwise, the EU may adopt 
appropriate measures (suspension of development cooperation and withdrawal of trade 
preferences) to force the ACP country into respecting its commitment.
10
 These measures are 
renewed until the EU considers that essential elements are restored. By reconsidering the 
EU’s commitments in terms of trade and development, Article 96 measures are an instrument 
that aims at restoring consistency across the three dimensions of the Cotonou partnership. 
                                                             
9
 Interim agreement establishing a framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
Eastern and Southern Africa States, on the one part, and the European Community and its Member 
States, on the other part, OJ L 111/2-1172, 24.04.2012.  
10
 The EU may impose additional measures such as CFSP sanctions, what further sharpens the 
consistency challenge. 
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Article 96 measures have to reach a balance between different concerns. Instead of imposing 
general economic sanctions that would have an indiscriminate effect, EU measures target the 
leadership responsible for the objectionable behaviour while trying to inflict the least 
suffering on the population (Portela 2007: 39). This is the concept of targeted sanctions: they 
are conceived to achieve maximum impact in terms of foreign policy objectives with the least 
collateral damage. They limit the possibility of the targeted leadership to instrumentalise the 
sanctions and any contamination effect of sanctions over particular areas of cooperation or to 
neighbours of the targeted regime (European Parliament 1982: 14).  
2.3. The decision-making process of renewing Article 96 measures 
The third level to ensure consistency is the decision-making process of the Commission. It 
concretely implements the general and policy-specific commitment to consistency. In our case 
study, these are the rules of procedure applied by the European Commission when drafting its 
proposal to renew Article 96 measures against Zimbabwe. First, the consistency and 
coordination responsibilities as they have developed since Lisbon are specified; secondly, the 
drafting procedure itself is discussed.  
2.3.1. The lead service on Article 96 since Lisbon 
Following the setting up of the EEAS, the Article 96 procedure was amended and the lead 
responsibility for preparing the Commission proposal changed.
11
 Since January 2011, the 
EEAS has replaced DG Development as chef de file on Article 96. The EEAS’ role is part of 
the support provided by the service to the HRVP in her capacity as VP of the Commission. 
The post-Lisbon era, although synonymous with a new institutional architecture and a new 
division of tasks, is de facto characterised by continuity. This is illustrated by the fact that the 
Commissioner for Development is co-responsible for the proposal (EEAS/European 
Commission 2012; EEAS/European Commission 2011). The change of the chef de file is 
actually more formal than substantial: according to interviewees (Interviews 1, 4, 11), little 
has changed but the name of the lead service as the officials from DG Development have 
simply changed hat and transferred to the EEAS. Until 31
st
 December 2010, the desk 
Zimbabwe was based within DG Development but as from January 2011 onwards, it was 
relocated to the EEAS (Interviews 1, 4). However, the updated rules of procedure were only 
formally adopted in March 2012 (EEAS/European Commission 2012). The EEAS is now 
responsible for the inter-service consultation (ISC) on the decision to renew measures, in 
association with DG Devco (ibidem). Overall, the proposal remains a Commission proposal 
presented jointly by the HRVP and the Commissioner for Development (ibidem). 
This new arrangement is both an advantage and a disadvantage. On the positive side, it allows 
to build on DG Devco’s expertise in development cooperation. In addition, the EEAS’ 
                                                             
11
 The internal document specifying the new procedure under Article 96 was adopted only after the 
2012 renewal (EEAS/European Commission 2012). 
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mandate puts the issue of measures against Zimbabwe in the broader context of EU action in 
this country and facilitates a comprehensive strategy towards Zimbabwe. The EEAS’ 
responsibility, in association with DG Devco, for consistency and coordination within the 
Commission is complemented by its role within the Council. As permanent chair of the 
COAFR, the Council working group on Africa negotiating the political decision on Article 96 
(EEAS/European Commission 2012), the EEAS bridges the gap between the Commission and 
member states.
12
 
A weakness is that it introduces an inter-institutional dimension to the drafting process. In 
principle, this inter-institutional dimension complicates coordination, as the EEAS is not 
formally a DG of the Commission. The coordination between different institutions is 
generally more challenging and sensitive than intra-institutional coordination. First, from a 
procedural point of view, because the EEAS is an “outsider” and a new player, decision-
making had to be adapted. New rules had to be established for the diplomatic service to work 
with the Commission in the preparation of Commission proposals and IT-systems supporting 
the Commission’s internal decision-making process had to be updated to allow the 
participation of the EEAS. Second, from a substantial point of view, the EEAS and the 
Commission do not have the same competences. It follows that they may have conflicting 
objectives. Another consequence is that the EEAS and the Commission do not necessarily 
have access to the same information regarding the situation in a particular country, a fact that 
may also hinder the drafting of the proposal. 
The Secretariat General of the Commission (SG) still plays a key role in supervising 
coordination in the post-Lisbon era. When the EEAS prepares a draft to be adopted as a 
Commission proposal, the Commission’s rules of procedure apply. The EEAS, even if it is 
formally an autonomous body, has to launch an inter-service consultation (see next sub-
section) according to the same rules as any Commission DG. The SG ensures that any 
interested service is formally included in the consultation and substantially participates in the 
drafting, to ensure the consistency of the proposal despite the formal separation between 
services.  
Lastly, EU delegations in third countries constitute a new player in the field as they have 
competences across the full range of the EU’s external policies compared to the 
Commission’s delegations in the pre-Lisbon era. In practice, the two main points about 
delegations remain the same before and after the Lisbon Treaty. First, delegations are in 
charge of monitoring concrete developments and of providing feedback to Brussels, should a 
particular situation arise that needs to be addressed. Second, a delegation’s focus and role 
tends to be heavily influenced by the personality and background of the head of delegation, 
what may in turn weaken the (perceived) consistency of EU action (Interviews 3, 4). A head 
of delegation too close to the position of DG Devco will be criticised by some member states. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, others will dislike too strong a focus on human rights 
issues (Interview 3).  
                                                             
12
 In contrast, the ACP working group (that discusses the operational consequence of Article 96 
decisions for development cooperation) is still chaired by the rotating Presidency; DG Devco 
represents the Commission in the group as well.  
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2.3.2. Drafting the Commission’s proposal to renew appropriate measures 
To prepare the 2012 renewal of appropriate measures, the decision-making procedure has 
only been adapted to the extent necessary to account for the Lisbon change in the 
responsibilities of the different actors. The Commission still adopts the proposal by written 
procedure even though the EEAS has now become the chef de file. Informal efforts and 
formal coordination processes hereby play an important role.  
Informal instruments receive much importance in the decision-making process as 
coordination is not a one-time effort but a continuous process. In contrast to 2002 when the 
Article 96 measures were first adopted, the preparation of the 2012 proposal built on a long 
legacy of interaction and cooperation. The actors’ positions are well known. Daily contacts, 
very close working relationships but also joint missions in the field serve the purpose of 
drafting a consensual proposal, which reflects every actor’s input. These elements are 
considered informal because they do not constitute compulsory steps of the decision-making. 
Since they establish the different positions, identify the margin for manoeuver and ease 
possible tensions, they facilitate the drafting. As a result, it becomes unlikely that a very sharp 
conflict arises during formal decision-making. Overall, the longer officials work on the same 
dossier, the more important informal contacts are and the stronger the position of the lead 
officer on the draft is. This was also the case with the EEAS desk Zimbabwe who, in 2012, 
had been working on Zimbabwe for three years, and was well aware of actors’ positions and 
of institutional dynamics on Zimbabwe.  
The EEAS-DG Devco “duo” (replacing the Relex-Development “duo” in the pre-Lisbon era) 
constitutes the nucleus of the Article 96 mechanism. This is illustrated by their participation 
in joint missions in Zimbabwe (Interview 4). They reflect the dual nature, foreign policy and 
development, of Article 96. DG Devco is a legitimate actor of the decision-making given its 
expertise of Article 96 in general and of Article 96 measures in Zimbabwe in particular. The 
EEAS adds the political dimension to the drafting of Commission proposal, bringing together 
the different aspects of EU action against Mugabe. 
As mentioned, the formal decision-making for the 2012 renewal was led by the EEAS, in 
particular by its Zimbabwe desk. Through the inter-service consultation, it consulted DG 
Devco, Trade
13
, ECHO, DG Budget, the legal service and the SG (EEAS/European 
Commission 2011). These DGs, as well as the service of foreign policy instruments, had 
participated in the informal contacts made by the EEAS before the ISC (Interview 19). This 
network of services had been collaborating on the Zimbabwean dossier since 2001.
14
 DG 
budget, the legal service and the SG must be consulted during any ISC. Therefore, we focus 
on the two substantial contributions made by Trade and Devco. DG Trade was included in the 
ISC because Article 96 measures could have an impact on the on-going negotiations of the 
                                                             
13
 As trade concerns seems to be secondary in the EU’s dealing with Zimbabwe, interviewees did not 
list DG Trade when first asked the question on the different DGs involved, but added it to the list of 
DGs included once asked specifically about DG Trade (Interview 4). 
14
 Since 2001 and the opening of Article 96 consultations against Zimbabwe, the same networks of 
DGs has been involved in the preparation process. DG Aidco, DG ECHO, DG Relex, DG Trade, the 
SG and the legal service were consulted by DG Development during the inter-service consultation 
(European Commission 2001). 
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EPA between the EU and Zimbabwe. It had already expressed concerns, at an earlier stage of 
the drafting, about the opportunity costs of renewing sanctions and appropriate measures in 
the light of EPA negotiations. During the formal ISC, it emphasised the potential synergies of 
the EU’s more flexible approach (resulting from the lifting of conditions and political 
reengagement) for trade-related activities and did not oppose the proposal. 
DG Devco focused on both the amount of funding and the modalities of development 
cooperation with Zimbabwe. It raised its voice as to the potential inconsistency between the 
Article 96 measures and development cooperation at large, given the very important amounts 
of aid still available to Zimbabwe (see sub-section 2.2.). It refused the inclusion in the 
proposal of a specific amount of development aid that would commit the EU in spite of the 
sanction package against Zimbabwe (European Commission 2012b: Annex; EEAS/European 
Commission 2011; Interview 13). The proposal only left open the possibility to normalise 
EU-Zimbabwe development cooperation with the signing of strategic documents as soon as 
essential elements would be restored (EEAS/European Commission 2011; European 
Commission 2012b: Annex). 
Once closed at DG level, the ISC went on at the political level. As the proposal was adopted 
by written procedure (EEAS/European Commission 2012), the process was rather 
straightforward. The proposal was circulated to all cabinets and as no objections were raised, 
it was deemed adopted. Interviewees did not refer to particular difficulties at cabinet-level. 
The Commission proposal COM(2012)26 final (European Commission 2012b) is a nine-page 
long document that consists of three parts. First, the explanatory memorandum traces back 
EU efforts to address the political situation in Zimbabwe and the evolution thereof. Second, it 
contains the proposal for the Council’s decision renewing appropriate measures against 
Mugabe’s regime. Third, the conditions of the renewal are specified in the Annex, “Letter to 
the President of Zimbabwe”, which explains the reasons behind the renewal and details the 
conditions of EU continued engagement in the country. 
In conclusion, this third level of analysis focuses on coordination, which is the key instrument 
to ensure consistency. It aims at ensuring the absence of contradiction between the different 
positions expressed within the Commission. Overall, it can be said that the coordination 
process went smoothly. The early exchange between different stakeholders, especially 
amongst the EEAS, DG Devco and DG Trade, helped to identify the different positions and 
concerns. In addition, it undoubtedly helped that several of the players involved had already a 
long track record of cooperation. The introduction by the Lisbon Treaty of one additional 
player added to the complexity of the coordination process. This challenge was however 
addressed elegantly by including the EEAS in the already well-established system of inter-
service consultation.  
3. Coordinating foreign policy, development cooperation and trade 
Building on the discussion of the three levels of the Treaty and policy frameworks, as well as 
the decision-making process, this section aims at assessing the consistency of the 
Commission’s proposal as it was ultimately adopted by the College of Commissioners. It does 
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so by discussing the absence or existence of contradictions between the actual content of the 
proposal and its primary objective, namely the restoration of essential elements in Zimbabwe 
(EEAS/European Commission 2011).  
By definition, Article 96 places foreign policy objectives at the top of the hierarchy of 
objectives. Legally, recognised as “essential elements”, democratic principles, the rule of law 
and human rights have to be respected. Whenever an ACP country violates any of these 
elements, the EU may pressure it into normalising the situation. The primary objective of the 
2012 Commission’s proposal was the restoration of essential elements in Zimbabwe. 
Although it recognised that the political situation had positively evolved (European 
Commission 2012b: (3), (4)), the EU nevertheless renewed the measures because the progress 
made did not suffice. It was argued that “the implementation of political reforms [had] 
remain[ed] slow and certain essential elements of the ACP-EU partnership agreement, to 
which the GNU [Government of National Unity] had committed in the Global Political 
Agreement [GPA], still need[ed] to be implemented” (European Commission 2012b: (4)). In 
particular the constitutional process, the organisation of peaceful and credible elections 
(European Commission 2012b: Article 1) and the areas of respect for human rights and the 
rule of law needed further efforts (European Commission 2012b: Annex). Yet, measures were 
renewed for only 6 months, a shorter period than the previous one-year renewals. This 
illustrated EU reengagement and a much more dynamic approach to Zimbabwe (European 
Commission 2012b: Article 1). In conclusion, the renewal was justified on the basis of the 
insufficient respect for essential elements. The more flexible framework introduced by the 
renewal – as well as the support provided by the EU to regional mediation efforts led by 
South Africa – showed a pro-active Union, eager to ensure that its decision would contribute 
to the realisation of the primary objective in all its dimensions. Therefore, it qualifies for a 
high degree of consistency with the EU’s foreign policy objectives in the country. 
While being a possibility under Article 96, development cooperation with Zimbabwe was 
never fully suspended. Although this may have given a strong message to the Zimbabwean 
government, it would have been in contradiction with EU development objectives. 
Appropriate measures led to the imposition of very specific conditions upon development 
cooperation, aimed at a continued support of the population. First, appropriate measures 
reduced the availability of EDF for the country targeted. The adoption of the measures 
prevents the use of the A-envelope for a country (l'enveloppe pays) aimed at general budget 
support. Funds may however still come from the B-envelope, which the EDF reserves for 
unforeseen needs (Interviews 4, 5, 6, 13; European Commission, DG Development and 
Cooperation – EuropeAid (n.d.); Article 3.2 of the Annex IV of the Cotonou agreement). 
Secondly, it means that, for EDF and other budget lines and financial instruments to be used, 
certain conditions must be met. Funds are available to activities in direct support of the 
population, in particular in the social sectors, democratisation, respect for human rights and 
the rule of law (European Commission 2012b: Annex). The EU also provides support to 
institutions and processes related to the implementation of the GPA since 2010 (Council of 
the EU 2010: 2). The 2012 renewal reaffirmed these conditions and the EU’s commitment to 
support the implementation of the GPA (European Commission 2012b: Annex). Overall, the 
difference compared to a country not targeted by Article 96 measures is not the amount of aid 
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but the modalities of development cooperation. A total suspension would have given ACP 
countries the opportunity to coalesce against the EU. For Zimbabwe, it could be a chance to 
“demonize” the EU while the population was suffering, in turn strengthening the country that 
the EU was sanctioning and jeopardising the realisation of the EU’s primary objective 
(Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4). In conclusion, there was no contradiction between the partial 
suspension of development cooperation and the primary objective of the EU in Zimbabwe. 
With the progressive relaxation of the conditions under which development cooperation could 
take place, the objective is for the action taken in this dimension to fully contribute to the 
restoration of essential elements, what illustrates again the EU’s active reengagement strategy 
(Council of the EU 2012). Also with regard to the overall development objectives towards 
Zimbabwe, the proposal qualifies for a high degree of consistency. 
In an effort to adopt a consistent proposal there was a consensus to exclude trade restrictions 
from appropriate measures since 2002. This approach was motivated by two reasons.
15
 First, 
trade measures would also have run counter to development objectives as trade is seen as an 
instrument for economic development. Trade measures would have mostly threatened 
farmers, the engine of the economy, thus further weakening Zimbabwe’s economic 
development. It would have clearly jeopardised economic and development objectives. 
Zimbabwe's government would also have instrumentalised trade measures the way it did with 
appropriate measures and sanctions in general as targeting an innocent population. Second, 
trade sanctions (in the form of withdrawal of trade preferences) would have jeopardised 
broader foreign policy objectives. They would have put a strain on the EU-ACP partnership. 
ACP states participating in the initial consultations in 2002 had already expressed their 
concerns that it would constitute a precedent in the mutual relationship (Interview 2). The EU 
could not take the risk to create a hostile coalition of ACP states, which in turn would have 
reinforced Zimbabwe's position and correspondingly weakened the overall EU’s position 
(Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4). In conclusion, the renewed exclusion of trade measures in 2012 did not 
contradict the primary foreign policy objective in Zimbabwe but it did not actively contribute 
to its realisation either. This qualifies for a medium degree of consistency between the 
appropriate measures and the EU trade objectives vis-à-vis Zimbabwe. Interestingly, trade 
relations actually even provided a venue for continued interaction between the EU and 
Zimbabwe and created a challenging situation for the larger EU-ACP trade relationship. 
Indeed, in 2012 the EU and Zimbabwe (a member of the Eastern and Southern African 
grouping) were negotiating a new trade agreement, the Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA). Although the Zimbabwean crisis did not constitute a contentious issue during the 
negotiation of the agreement, Mugabe’s government delayed ratification to express its 
discontent, thereby weakening the EU’s position in international trade negotiations between 
February and May 2012 (Interview 12; European Commission 2012a). 
Given its primary objective of the restoration of the essential elements in Zimbabwe, finding 
the balance between foreign policy, development and trade objectives was a challenging 
exercise for the Commission. Although foreign policy objectives such as the respect for 
human rights, democratic principles and rule of law were the priority, neither development 
nor trade concerns were disregarded. Within the substantial limits defined by the policy 
                                                             
15
 The only trade element is the arms embargo in CFSP sanctions. 
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framework, development and trade were part of EU strategy in Zimbabwe and considered to 
be the vector of continued support to the population in the field. In addition, EU actors were 
also aware of the risk that a total suspension of development cooperation and trade restrictive 
measures could be instrumentalised by the Zimbabwean government, what would have in turn 
jeopardised the realisation of the primary objective. In conclusion, the Commission’s proposal 
to renew appropriate measures reached a medium to high degree of consistency and there was 
no contradiction between the specifics of these measures on one hand and the primary 
objective of the restoration of essential elements on the other hand.  
4. Factors of consistency and factors of inconsistency 
So far, this research has mainly looked into how different levels providing for consistency 
have been applied in practice with special attention for the third level and its provisions on 
coordination. The application of the three-level framework is however not a sufficient 
guarantee for consistency. There will always be contextual factors, which may impact on the 
consistency of the proposal. Building on the empirical findings and the interviews conducted 
for the case study, the next section identifies these factors and explains successively how the 
international context, member states’ pressure and internal factors influenced the consistency 
of the proposal. 
4.1. The international factor 
The international factor is the first element that we have identified as having an impact on the 
consistency of the proposal. As is the case with any foreign policy player, the EU rarely acts 
in isolation. Its foreign policy is often formulated in interaction with policies conducted by 
third countries or by other international fora. In 2012, the EU took a regional perspective and 
chose to support mediation efforts led by South Africa, a country considered as a strategic 
partner (Interviews 1, 4, 8). Reassured by South Africa’s new approach (SADC 2011), the EU 
decided to accompany mediation by relaxing the restrictions imposed by Article 96 measures 
(European Commission 2012b: Explanatory memorandum (11), (12)). It did not agree to an 
immediate and complete lifting of appropriate measures but provided for more flexible 
conditions in development cooperation and enhanced its reengagement strategy. 
4.2. The member states factor 
Member states formally only come in once a Commission proposal is on the table. However, 
in general, as the Commission wants its proposals to be acceptable to member states, it will, 
already at the drafting stage, take into account the views of the Council. One interviewee even 
called the discussion at the Council the “third step of inter-service consultation” (Interview 4). 
This is not always easy since on many foreign policy issues, national positions tend to 
diverge. The particular nature of the Cotonou agreement gives even more power to the 
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member states. Indeed, this agreement is a mixed agreement, what implies that different 
institutions have their word to say in the final decision: the EEAS, the Commission and the 
Council. The multiplicity of actors implied that a choice had to be made between different 
preferences, a choice rendered more complex by the fact that foreign policy remains inter-
governmental, development is a shared competence and trade an exclusive competence of the 
EU. All this made the internal coordination efforts within the Commission more challenging 
(Laakso, Kivimäki and Seppänen 2007: 22).  
In addition, Zimbabwe is a case where member states’ interests have always been particularly 
salient (Grebe 2010: 12-13; Stübig 2007: 2; Interviews 3, 4, 9). Their prime concern was to 
send a strong signal against an illegitimate regime. This was illustrated by the fact that Article 
96 consultations were opened upon request from the Council and not on the Commission’s 
own initiative. When appropriate measures were first adopted in 2002, the salience of member 
states’ opinions on Zimbabwe, especially of hardliners such as the United Kingdom and the 
Nordic countries, steered the drafting towards the adoption of appropriate measures. The latter 
worked hard to ensure compliance with their requests while upholding the principles and 
values of the Cotonou agreement (Laakso, Kivimäki and Seppänen 2007: 29; Hazelzet 2005: 
11). 
Also in 2012, the Commission again faced the challenge to come up with an acceptable 
proposal in the context of renewed inter-institutional dynamics. The influence exercised by 
the Council, informally, was particularly powerful in the decision-making. The presence of 
the United Kingdom in particular made the lifting of the measures impossible (Interviews 7, 
8, 9). However, the evolution of the Nordic countries towards a more relaxed position allowed 
for a more dynamic approach (Interview 9). The result was the renewal of appropriate 
measures for a shorter period of time than the previous renewal and under relaxed restrictions 
(European Commission 2012b: Explanatory memorandum (5), (6), (7), (9)). Besides, tensions 
with member states were felt not only during the initial drafting of the Commission’s 
proposal. They also re-appeared at a later stage, when the Commission’s proposal was 
discussed within COAFR, the Council working group on Africa.   
A further challenge for the Commission was that consistency was not the member states’ 
primary concern. They had focused on sending a strong, decisive signal from the outset of the 
crisis, without consideration for the risk of instrumentalisation and criticism of inconsistent 
measures, a point that the Commission had raised repeatedly. It was the role of the EEAS and 
the Commission in 2012 to ensure the consistency of the decision, also taking into account the 
trade and development dimensions. Exploring internal dynamics, to which the paper now 
turns, will help to better explain the content of the proposal.  
4.3. Internal factor 
To better explain the content of the 2012 Commission proposal, it is also relevant to look at 
the internal dynamics within the leadership on Article 96. Overall, coordination under the 
leadership of the EEAS and DG Devco went smoother in 2012 than in 2002 when measures 
were first adopted. Indeed, although not normalised yet, the situation in Zimbabwe had 
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improved. Besides, the positions of different actors had moved closer together as they had 
been working for ten years on the dossier. The change from a crisis response to what can be 
considered a form of repetitive decision-making had created a common ground on which to 
prepare the proposal. We concentrate on the contributions made by DG Trade and DG Devco 
in response to the draft circulated by the EEAS during the inter-service consultation.  
Although appropriate measures did not include a trade dimension, DG Trade was consulted 
on the draft proposal. Its contribution focused on the opportunity costs to renew appropriate 
measures while being at the same time negotiating an EPA with Zimbabwe. The negotiation 
of the trade agreement was giving Zimbabwe leverage over the EU as its ratification was 
needed. Indeed, the text of the EPA with ESA had been initialled at the end of 2007 by six 
(out of 11) ESA countries but signed by four countries only in August 2009 (European 
Commission, DG Trade 2012). As the ratification of four ESA countries was needed for the 
EPA to be applicable, ratification by Zimbabwe was a sine qua non. To a certain extent, 
Zimbabwe could hold the EU and the other ESA countries hostage but the EU eventually 
received Zimbabwe’s ratification instrument in May 2012. DG Trade expressed, informally, 
its concern that the proposal prepared by the EEAS to renew appropriate measures – and the 
sanction package in general – would further delay the ratification process and create a 
politically and legally challenging situation for the EU. However, it did not raise any 
obstacles during the formal inter-service consultation (EEAS/European Commission 2011; 
Interview 12).  
To a certain extent, the position of DG Devco was ambiguous. On one side, DG Devco 
advocated reengagement with Zimbabwe. Highlighting the added value of continuous efforts 
towards the support of political developments taking place, Devco supported the lifting of 
conditions to allow the EU to significantly support the GPA and GNU (European 
Commission 2012b: Explanatory memorandum (10); Interviews 1, 4). It also supported the 
proposed step towards the normalisation of EU-Zimbabwe relations and the readiness of the 
EU to reconsider its action in the country at any time, should Zimbabwe make new political 
progress. On the other side, DG Devco proved strict on the possibility to commit EU 
development funds to Zimbabwe as was initially envisaged by the EEAS. The drafting of the 
proposal took place in the middle of a review exercise conducted by DG Devco on the 
consistency of EU development aid in general. Devco raised several concerns in that respect. 
Above all, it was concerned about the large amounts of aid still channelled to Zimbabwe 
despite the existence of Article 96 measures. Compared not only to amounts available to other 
countries targeted by Article 96 measures but also to countries not targeted by this 
mechanism, this raised serious consistency issues for EU development policy in general 
(Interview 13). For this reason, it did not want to include in the proposal a commitment to 
additional funds for Zimbabwe. The issue was not only raised during the inter-service 
consultation but also within the Council, where some member states wanted to restate their 
interest for Zimbabwe by already defining specific amounts of aid. Eventually, the decision 
did not commit EU funds but made a step towards the normalisation of the relation with 
Zimbabwe. 
Tensions within the Commission as well as between the Commission and the EEAS illustrate 
the politicisation of the discussion on Zimbabwe and the salience of diverse interests. They 
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are to a large extent embedded in Article 96 itself as this mechanism requires at the same time 
a strong political decision and adaptation of the framework for development cooperation 
(Interview 4).  
Conclusion 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, consistency of EU external action has become a real buzzword but 
little is known about how this imperative is concretely given shape. By empirically studying 
how the EU is translating the consistency requirement into practice in the case of the adoption 
of appropriate measures against Zimbabwe, this paper tried to get a better insight into this 
issue. 
As a first step, this article examined the relevant legal (Treaty), substantial (policy 
framework) and procedural (decision-making process) guidelines framing the consistency 
objective in the EU’s relations with the ACP countries. The first level of the Treaty 
framework outlines the mutually reinforcing nature of the different dimensions – foreign 
policy, development and trade – on which the Cotonou agreement builds. At the second level 
of the policy framework, the EU has proactively set up mechanisms to avoid contradictions 
between different objectives in the design of appropriate measures. In particular, the B-
envelope of the EDF for unforeseen needs ensures, under specific conditions, that 
development cooperation continues despite the existence of appropriate measures. This allows 
for hitting a government in breach of democratic principles (foreign policy objective) while 
simultaneously continuing to support the population (development objective). The third level 
of the decision-making process consists of mechanisms and rules of procedure that aim at 
reconciling different objectives through a well-developed process of inter-service 
coordination. The introduction of the EEAS as a new actor in the leading role of the drafting 
of the Commission’s proposal by the Lisbon Treaty has proved relatively unproblematic. This 
can mainly be explained by the fact that the EEAS participates in the inter-service 
consultation of the Commission according to the same rules as any Commission DG.  
The three-level framework we identified plays an important role in facilitating the consistency 
of a proposal but is not a sufficient guarantee for consistency. The case study on Zimbabwe 
illustrated that the success of this framework in leading to a consistent output is influenced by 
other factors such as the international context, the positions of the member states as well as 
the preferences and interests of individual DGs. Overall our analysis has shown that the 2012 
proposal to renew the appropriate measures against Zimbabwe reaches a medium to high 
degree of consistency. This has to do with several factors that contributed to the emergence of 
a consensus around the necessity to adopt a more comprehensive approach to Zimbabwe in 
order to support the realisation of the primary foreign policy objective. First, the evolution of 
the regional context and more particularly mediation efforts by South Africa led the Union to 
adopt a more pragmatic attitude towards Zimbabwe, leading to more flexible conditions in 
development cooperation. Second, this trend was reinforced by member states’ readiness to 
rethink the strategy vis-à-vis Mugabe’s government and to allow for more relaxed restrictions, 
reducing the tensions between foreign policy and development objectives. Lastly, over time, 
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an integrated network of officials working on Zimbabwe grew, allowing for the development 
of a comprehensive strategy towards the political situation, coordinating different dimensions 
and approaches for more effectiveness. The three factors had a mutually reinforcing influence 
on the content of the proposal. A contrario, the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty were 
not influential in explaining this outcome. 
Since this contribution is limited to only one case study, it would at this stage be inappropriate 
to try to draw general conclusions on the consistency of EU external action post-Lisbon. Still, 
the three-level framework of extensive legal, substantial and procedural guidelines identified 
in this article indicates that the consistency aspiration of the EU is more than an empty shell. 
The fact that the general Treaty articles have been translated into extensive policy and 
procedural guidelines is certainly encouraging. However, this article has also shown that a 
consistent policy output is not merely dependent on well-developed guiding principles. They 
are a first step and a helpful instrument but in the end their success will heavily depend on the 
broader context in which they are applied. Further research, possibly based on the framework 
used in this article, should allow to further sharpen our insights. 
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